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Introduction: The Question of the Nation-State
Imagine a world where a minimum of 253 countries is the norm – a world where every
currently active secessionist movement globally succeeded. It would be an increase in numbers
rivaling a little under half of the currently recognized 193 states in United Nations (UN). In the
30 years since the fall of the USSR, the nation-state system has exploded onto the world stage,
becoming the dominant global order, carrying with it a distinctive sense that it has always been
the norm. But the truth of the matter is that it’s a system in its relative infancy and in the 21st
century, its faltering. Weighed down by globalist and nationalist forces beyond its control,
shaken at its foundations by a growing trend of secessionist movements, the fragility of the
nation-state in the 21st century is definitive. The only question that remains is which force is of
most consequence to the endurance of the nation-state.
The 20th century was the first definitive moment of the nation-state. From the pre-WWI
era to the post-Cold War era, the number of nation-states in the world more than tripled. In part,
this was due to the decline of colonialism in the period between WWI and WWII. The creation
of several states – particularly in the Baltics and Balkans – formerly part of the now-dissolved
communist bloc also contributed to its spread. In the contemporary moment, one would be hardpressed to find a state which has not settled into this dominant system, an impressive feat for a
global order only 30 years into its reign. Yet it’s a global order that the world and the states
within it are still exploring, and despite its perceived stability, a process that has been far from
untroubled.
With the rise of the nation-state came the rise of its most pressing challenges: nationalism
and globalism. These two phenomena will later be examined at length in this thesis. Nationalism,
primarily, boomed in the post-Cold War era. Rapid expansion of the ideology backed by
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violence from internal groups – though violence is not an inherent characteristic - created a force
which could bring the nation-state to its knees (Gaddis 1991, 105). Secondly is globalism, a
matter which has become increasingly pressing thanks to the rise of technology along with
transnational organizations creating an increasingly interconnected world (Biswas 2002, 176).
When seeking to explain the decline of the nation-state, there are no more pertinent suspects than
these two ideologies. This thesis will, however, argue in favor of nationalism, particularly
subnational identities, in the nation-state’s decline in the contemporary moment.
The literature that this thesis reviewed is split into two segments. The first segment
involves an analysis of the nation-state as a concept. Whether a nation-state can be truly formed,
in the traditional sense of the nation-state, is up for debate. For a nation-state to truly be a nationstate, the authority (state) must be synonymous with a culturally and ethnically homogeneous
populous (nation). In practice, this would mean that no modern state could be classified as a
nation-state, except for very few countries mostly due to their historical isolation. The other
argument surrounding the nation-state, therefore, is that states construct an idea of a nation
through which to create a nation-state where the criteria is lacking. This thesis will operate on the
acceptance of the nation-state as a concept, but through the lens that most modern nation-states
construct an identity which creates an image of a nation that qualifies the country as a nationstate.
The second segment of the literature review concerns itself with the literatures
surrounding nationalism and globalism and their effects on the nation-state. The literature of
nationalism is of specific importance to this thesis as it engages with two case studies of
subnational identities. Nationalism is a complex topic and as one can imagine, unanimous
agreement on which form is most prevalent does not exist, nor does agreement on the definition
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of nationalism. This thesis aligns itself with the theory of nationalism sourcing from Benedict D.
Anderson and his concept of “imagined communities.” While this thesis does not agree with all
aspects of Anderson’s theory, it is this foundational basis of nationalism theory which this paper
will utilize to argue for the role of nationalism in the decline of the nation-state system.
The other theory of relevancy, as noted, is globalism. Scholars agree that the
contemporary world is increasingly interconnected. The result of this increased interconnection
is globalism, a theory which posits that a greater connected world results in greater power to
non-state entities which work across borders and complicate the position of nation-states in the
global order (Biswas 2002, 185-187, Smolicz 2009). The debate surrounding globalism concerns
itself with whether globalism is an aiding or destructive force to the nation-state, particularly in
terms of sovereignty. Generally, this thesis rejects the role of globalism and its effects on the
nation-state placing merit in internal forces, rather than the external forces of globalism, pushing
the nation-state to the brink.
Two case studies provide much of the data for this thesis, through historical secondary
and primary accounts, legal/governmental documentation, and contemporary news sources. This
thesis will explore the regions of Catalonia in Spain and Quebec in Canada, with particular
attention paid to their longstanding secessionist movements. This thesis will explore their
similarities, both historical and contemporary, and the implications which their respective stories
and motivations for secession have for broader trends impacting the nation-state in the 21st
century.
Through an analysis of these two case studies, this thesis makes the argument that the
decline of the modern nation-state is a result of a state’s failure to acknowledge and incorporate
the subnational identities within their border at their conception of a nation. This failure was
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continued and then worsened by active oppression of the culture, language, and identity of these
subnational groups. A sense of exclusion and exploitation leads to discontent with the metropole
of a subnational group, leading to internal nationalistic forces which create a pressure on the
state’s authority and the overall stability of the nation-state. In many cases, this phenomenon
leads to fragmentation – A process which “…occurs when there is a disarticulation between the
space as a spatial unit (with fixed territory) with the spatial claims of the nation(s) in whose
name it speaks (Biswas 2002, 176) - whether attempted or successful. Contextualizing the
current condition of the nation-state in terms of these two case studies reveals a larger trend
globally of subnational identities who, affected by the same grievances, seek to secede or
separate from a state which may be at best neglecting them, at worst actively oppressing them.
Particularly in the 21st century, many subnational groups with historical and contemporary
grievances are experiencing a resurgence. In their rise, however, is the decline of the nation-state.
The order of this thesis will begin with a contextual look at the history of the nation-state,
understanding its historical foundations and its rise in the 20th century. This contextual history
will also take a brief look at the condition of the nation-state in the 21st century. Following that,
there will be an exploration of the most prominent challenges to the nation-state in the
contemporary era and putting their rise in the context of the rise of the nation-state. The next
section will be a literature review of the literatures surrounding the nation-state as an ideology,
then a review of the literature surrounding the theory of nationalism, then the theory of
globalism. This will be followed by a methodology section explaining how data was acquired for
this thesis and how it will be used. Following that, this thesis will present its data. This data will
be presented in the context of two case studies of secessionist regions in the world, as well as an
analysis as to what this means for the nation-state and why the nation-state is struggling in this
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current era. Finally, this thesis will conclude with a reflection of all that has been covered
throughout the course of this thesis and a reflection on what, altogether, this means for the
nation-state in the 21st century.

Context: The Rise of the Nation-State, the Rise of Its Challenges
History of the Nation-State
Undeniably, the nation-state, both as an ideology and as a system, and its dominance
have been a long-time coming. Where one believes the nation-state system to have truly begun
will vary, and this thesis will of course assert its position on that in a short-while. For some
scholars of the nation-state, they point to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. A treaty which
brought the end of the Thirty Years War between the Holy Roman Empire and various protestant
splinter groups (Kayaoglu 2010, 193-194), it is a point to which many scholars attribute the rise
in eminence of the modern nation-state. This thesis does not seek to argue that there is no merit
to the theory of the Peace of Westphalia as a point in the history of the nation-state. Undeniably,
the Peace of Westphalia is a moment of major importance in the history of the state system. It
established rights of sovereignty and set the foundation for what would become the modern,
international state system, as well as set up noninterventional religious standards allowing for
greater interstate cooperation (ibid., 194-195). It would be remiss to not be mindful of the fact
that there are those who completely reject this historical narrative. For some scholars, this
peaceful and cooperative narrative is nothing more than a form of masking by the states who
benefitted the most form it (ibid., 197-198). That is neither here nor there for the point of this
thesis, other than that this thesis will reject the idea that the Peace of Westphalia was the birth of,
specifically, the nation-state system. As noted, the Peace of Westphalia began the modern state
system – but just that. The Peace of Westphalia was not responsible for the beginning of the
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nation-state system, only the beginning of what the world now knows as the modern states. In a
short while, this thesis will define its concept of the state. For now, what this thesis wishes to
establish is that the nation-state is both an ideology and a system. In terms of it being a system, it
is a circumstance under which the authority of a territory (the state) is synonymous with a
homogeneous ethnic and cultural group (the nation) (King 2002, 359). The Peace of Westphalia
established the state, but it did not establish the nation and therefore is not where one should look
to for the beginning of the nation-state.
For much of the world’s history, the predominant form of state organization was
imperialist states. Massive conglomerate states which controlled endless colonial holdings and
amassed huge amounts of wealth dominated the world stage. However, it was in the context of
this overwhelming imperialism that the world’s first two nation-states would emerge. In 1783
and 1789, two states underwent massive revolutions – one to shuck off their colonial masters and
the others to pursue a new form of government – and in these revolutions the world’s first
nation-states, the United States and France, emerged (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010, 764). These
states and their nations could be considered the first major imagined communities in the global
order, a concept this thesis will explore in the literature review. They were nations united not by
a common ethnic or cultural identity, but united by a distinct sense of what it meant to be an
American and French, what it meant to be part of those nations as the people who had revolted
against and successfully freed themselves from rulers they rejected. The identity of being
American or being French was constructed, crafted out of these revolutions to define a nation
united under the identity of their accomplishments (ibid.). These two countries did then rapidly
join the imperialist order, amassing their own colonies and contributing to global Western
dominance and effectively shying away from the nation-state system in favor of the imperialist
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system. However, they were the first standards for the nation-state system. Whether imperialist
states or not, they operated under a nation-state ideology and set a precedent that, indeed, a
nation-state could exist within such a greatly varying populous.
It is at this point that this thesis would like to pause and present how it comprehends and
understands the nation and the state. As the literature review will reveal, the nation-state and all
its adjacent fields of study vastly vary in definitions and understandings. Its near impossible to
get a harmonious consensus on nearly any of these topics, and therefore necessary to define how
one understands these concepts. For the purposes of the nation, this thesis accepts the definition
of Benedict Anderson, explored further in the literature review, who understands the nation as
“…an imagined political community…because the members of even the smallest nation will
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of
each lives the image of their communion.” (Anderson 1983, 6). In this definition of the nation,
the nation is a community which constructs and sets its own parameters. A nation, under
Anderson’s definition, can be as flexible, as restrictive, as encompassing or as exclusive as it
desires. There is no necessitated standard for what creates a nation, rather a nation is born out of
that which merits a collective identity which a community aligns itself within. As emphasized
prior, it is also important to understand that a nation is different from a state.
Defining a state is an easier process than parsing out what makes a nation. For the
definition of a state, this thesis will align with the Montevideo Convention of 1933. The
Montevideo Convention was a convention under which the standards of statehood were defined
for international law and is perhaps the most common point of reference when one seeks to
define statehood (Grant 1999). This thesis will also accept the definition of statehood established
by the Montevideo Convention. The Montevideo Convention defines a state as a political entity
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which possesses a permanent population, defined territory, sovereign authority, and ability to
enter into relations with other states (Grotenhuis 2006, 25). Again, like many theories in this
field and adjacent fields, this definition of the state has its dissenters. This thesis is not one of
them. Going forward in this thesis, when the nation and the state are referenced, one can
understand that they’re being referenced in the context of these two definitions. Continuing from
the Montevideo Convention, the next stage of history in the nation-state system began.
As briefly discussed prior the pre-WWI and WWII era was an era dominated by
imperialist states. The powers in Europe and North America held a great deal of influence and
power in the global order. The default form of statehood, in this period, was an imperial empire
(Reis 2004, 252). During the two world wars, as well as their interwar period, colonial empires
were forced to relinquish their colonial holdings and independence movements were on the rise
globally (Roshwald 2011, 13-15). During the 20th century, more nation-states were created than
at any other point in history. Pre-WWI, there were 62 independent states in the world. By the end
of the 20th century, the number of independent states in the world totaled over 193 (Gaddis 1991,
105, Kuvaldin and Ryabov 1999, 115). This trend began to truly accelerate in the post-war era.
The rise of and subsequent decline of the modern nation-state first began in the Post-Cold
War era. The year 1989 thrust upon the world an entirely new global order, cemented a mere 2
years later by the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) entirely and the
communist bloc with it. As the curtains closed on the global conflict between the United States
of America and the USSR, which defined the global stage for some 40-odd years, no nation-state
was certain what the new global order would be and more importantly, what their place in it
would be. (Gaddis 1991, 102-103, Talentino 2004, 557). The Post-Cold War global order was
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one faced with immediate pressure. It was an explosion of nation-states, but it was also the
beginning of what would come to be its greatest challenges.
Beginning Of The Challenges To the Nation-State
Rising foremost in prominence were issues of nationalism versus globalism. In his 1991
Foreign Affairs article, Gaddis refers to globalism as “integration.” It’s early naming is
ultimately irrelevant, but what is important is that in the post-Cold War era, nationalism and
globalism were immediately identified as future threats to the nation-state. Globalism is “The act
of bringing things together to constitute something that is whole; It involves breaking down
barriers that have historically separated nations and peoples in such diverse areas as politics,
economics, religion, technology and culture.” (Gaddis 1991, 103) Globalism is the influence of
forces outside the nation-state, which apply pressure and challenge the existing stability of a
state. Nationalism, meanwhile, is the opposite of globalism. Nationalism concerns those forces
inside the nation-state which create an internal pressure and challenge to stability. (Biswas 2002,
176). The international threat to states changed from the vague, looming communists in far-off
countries to forces that were arriving on their doorstep or had already been invited inside.
Nationalism is not new, nor is it a slow process. It had already been decimating states pre-fall of
the USSR, like Yugoslavia in 1991 and in the view of some historians, nationalism in the
Balkans and the tension that went with it was singlehandedly responsible for causing WWI.
Globalism is a newer phenomenon. As this thesis will explore in the literature review, globalism
is a process that existed before the late 1900s, but never could quite be as powerful as it was until
the late 1900s. States of course interacted across borders and entities which operated across
states did exist preceding the late 1900s, but it was the improved technology of the late 1900s
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that truly allowed globalism to explode and become one of the most pertinent threats to the
nation-state system.
Where Is the Nation-State Now?
The growth of the nation-state has not slowed. Nor has the growth of those phenomena
which destabilize it the most. In recent years, the trend of nation-states and their creation is
accelerating again. In the 1990s alone, 23 new stages began in the world. That number is while
also ignoring the several unrecognized states that have also appeared and have inconsistent
acknowledgements of their statehood. (Kuvaldin and Ryabov 1999, 124). Since 2000, five new
states have come to exist in the world (Goldfarb 2017) and as this thesis will explain during its
analysis, there are many subnational communities in the world whose goal is a nation-state of
their own. Today, the United Nations formally recognizes 193 states, but there are many
unrecognized nation-states still fighting for UN recognition like Palestine or Kosovo. The nationstate system has had a long and tumultuous history. As this thesis will exemplify, it’s a history
that is far from over and evolving by the day, like in the case of secessionist regions.
A Brief Look at Secessionism
This thesis looks at two secessionist regions in the world to understand the condition of
the nation-state in the 21st century. Secession is when a group or region in a country seeks to
separate from their metropole, the country which rules over them. Metropole is typically a term
reserved for a colonizing state which rules over a colonial holding. For lack of a more available
term and with an understanding that terms can and should evolve in usage as necessary, this
thesis will use metropole to refer to the states which oversee these secessionist regions, for in the
case of these regions, their integration was akin to colonization.
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The two secessionist regions that this thesis works through are Catalonia in Spain and
Quebec in Canada. At this point, this thesis will not give a fully comprehensive look into their
histories, as that is located in the data and analysis section of this thesis. What is pertinent to
know at this point is that these are two regions with longstanding secessionist movements within
their metropoles. Essentially since the moment of their integration, these states have experienced
unrest and discontent with their metropole, eventually ending up in attempted secession in both
cases. Catalonia and Quebec are not unique in their longstanding secessionist histories. There are
many regions in many countries who have also undergone varying degrees of autonomy, paired
with exploitation or active abuse by their metropoles, leading to a secessionist desire. Going
forward, this thesis wishes its reader to keep in mind that these challenging phenomena have
been building beneath the surface for decades. The nation-state, to some, seems unshakeable,
even inevitable. This thesis wishes to challenge that at the foundation, with the knowledge that
fundamentally, the nation-state is not as longstanding and stable as it seems now.

The Nation-State Itself: A Brief Literature Review
As this thesis explained in the previous section, the modern nation state was born
recently, beginning with the French and American revolutions in the late 18th century. These two
countries post-revolution were the first nation states, complete with a constitution and concerned
with equal rights for all citizens. At the time, every other country operated under a different
authority and legitimacy system (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010, 764). Imperialist states ruled,
particularly in Europe and North America, with vast empires and many colonial holdings.
Nation-states were slow to catch on and only in the last two centuries did being a nation state
become the norm (Reis 2004, 252). In the 20th century, the prominence of nation states rose to
even greater heights in the interwar period as well as post-1989, filled with more countries
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engaging in self-determination than any other time in history prior (Roshwald 2011, 13-15). If
one was to ask anyone in the know about this phenomenon today what the primary form of state
organization was, they’d tell you the nation state. But equipped with the knowledge that the
nation state is a relatively recent phenomenon, it begs the question as to whether to nation state is
as stable and as possible as one might think.
A nation state is defined as “…a territorial political unit (a state) whose borders coincide,
or nearly coincide, with a nation; it describes a situation in which an ethnic group does indeed
control its own state.” (King 2002, 359). The first problem with this idea is that a nation state
involves a nation. A nation, which involves a homogeneous community with a shared history,
culture and identity. The problem is that with nearly every single country in the world, this
cannot truly be done. Simply put, a nation state cannot exist except for in very rare cases of
historical isolation like Japan and Iceland (ibed.). Every other country is too diverse ethnically
and culturally to ever formulate a nation state properly. This problem was referenced by
Massimo D’Azeglio when he said, “We have created Italy; now we must create Italians.”
(Kustarev 2009, 88). Every country must attempt to create a nation, there is no situation in which
a nation state can naturally exist. Furthermore, the dominance of the nation state might not be as
unflawed as it seems. In modern times, Eastern Europe is struggling with a resurgence of
nationalism. In Africa, they’re struggling to maintain collapsing nation states. Meanwhile, in
Asia and the Middle East, the struggle to create a national identity under which the country can
unite hasn’t even finished (Hutchinson 2003, 6). Overall, the literature reveals that the nation
state as an entity is not as perfectly defined and realized as one may assume. It has flaws and
cracks, many of which surely contribute to its struggle to survive in the modern era.
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It must be noted at this point that this thesis is choosing to go forward with the
acceptance of the nation-state as a concept, but with the knowledge that nearly all modern states
must construct an ideal of a ‘nation’ which enables them to operate as a nation-state. Nationstates in the modern era are the result of a conception of an idea of a ‘nation’ which the state can
then tie to the state to successfully be classified as a nation-state. Therefore, every state
constructs an idea of a national of their state which tends to exclude particular groups. As this
thesis will delve into, this conception of a national identity by the state tends to exclude
subnational identities that exist within the nation-state at large.

The Challenges to the Nation-State: Literature Review
Nationalism
Nationalism is an incredibly complex field of study. There is a plethora of ways in which
scholars define and understand nationalism. To cover them all would be nearly impossible, but
there are some particularly strong schools of thought which stand out. Generally, three
explanations of nationalism are accepted and addressed by leading scholars: Instrumentalism, the
imagined community, and the primordialism approach.
The first form that this paper will address is instrumentalism, which heavily involves
state processes or state elites. Ernest Gellner, a prominent scholar of civic nationalism, views
industrial capitalism as the key developmental agent of nationalism. Nationalism in this context
is a social process, frequently undertaken by state elites, to create a labor force for an industrial
society (Schnee 2001, 5; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010, 767). Perhaps most important to this
definition of nationalism is that Gellner believes there is a need for the state and the nation to be
congruent. Without the state, there will not be nationalism (Schnee 2001, 6). Mylonas and Tudor
believe in this idea of an elite-created nationalism as well, but for slightly varying reasons to
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Gellner. Whilst Gellner believes in state-created nationalism as a way to create a labor force,
Mylonas and Tudor view it as a means to secure state authority and control over the people.
Nationalism as constructed by the state is a way for a state to ensure its stability (Mylonas and
Tudor 2021). Mylonas and Tudor also do not concern themselves with matters of capitalism.
Their concern is more or less entirely with nationalism as a social phenomenon. State elitesponsored nationalism bears some similarities to the next form of nationalism, which views
nationalism and the nation as an inseparable mix of politics and culture.
The next idea of nationalism is one wherein nationalism is an imagined community, both
a cultural community and a political one. The concept of the imagined community is the most
relevant to this thesis and its work. The primary scholar regarding plural nationalism is Benedict
Anderson. In his book, Imagined Communities, Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined
community: it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign.” (Anderson 1983, 6) Anderson views the nation as a community which is limited in
size due to its position as a social group, the fundamental group to which one belongs, and the
final arbiter of its affairs. In other words, a nation is sovereign (Schnee 2001, 8). In Anderson’s
form of nationalism, nationalism is a process undertaken by a community which believes in a
well-defined group identity and seeks sovereignty. This definition of nationalism is particularly
pertinent to the topic of this paper as the case studies utilized participate in this sort of plural
nationalism, each having a uniquely defined group identity through which they strive to achieve
sovereignty. Other scholars echo Anderson’s sentiments. One such scholar is Alonso, who talks
at length about the necessity for a nation to be sovereign and limited in its membership, creating
an “in-group” and an “out-group” which defines it (Alonso 1994, 382-383). Alonso, however,
breaks off with Anderson to a degree. She stresses the relevance of nationalism resultant of the
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totalization and homogenization of state-building (ibed., 391), a matter which Anderson does not
concern himself with. Nationalism which posits the nation as both a political and cultural
community closes resembles the next form of nationalism, ethnic nationalism.
Primordialism is perhaps one of the most forefront manifestations of nationalism.
Primordialism, and its general ideology of ethnic nationalism, is responsible for historical events
like the downfall of Yugoslavia and the secession of countries like Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania
following the fall of the Soviet Union. Primordialism’s leading scholar is Anthony D. Smith.
Smith provides his own definition of the nation as “…a named human population sharing a
historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass standardized public culture, a
common territory and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members.”
The paramount issue with Smith’s definition of the nation is that it conflates the idea of a nation
and a state, when they are not the same (Schnee 2001, 3). However, the core of Smith’s theory
relies around the concept of an “ethnie”, which is a named population possessing myths of
shared culture, homeland, ancestry and a sense of solidarity which drives them. For Smith, to be
a nation requires having control of a state (ibed., 4-5). Smith’s is a theory which links ethnicity to
nationalism and gives birth to the rise of ethnonationalism, a phenomenon which has been
heavily attributed to the changing global landscape in the past several decades. Walker Connor
has a similar view on nations, though a much more simplified version. Connor defines nations,
very simply, as self-aware ethnic groups. If an ethnic group is not aware of their unique qualities,
then they are not a nation and therefore do not and cannot participate in ethnonationalism (ibed.,
7). Connor, like Smith, mixes the concept of a nation and a state as intrinsic links. Another
scholar who contributes to this discussion is Josh Hutchinson, who defines a nation as a moral
community and, similarly to Smith, emphasizes the shared history, origin, culture and common
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territory. Hutchinson breaks with Smith, however, in that he does not believe a nation
necessitates a state. Hutchinson argues, in fact, that nationalism is a prerequisite for a state to
form and quite frequently, nations and their nationalism are far older than the states that result
from them. Frequently, an effective state requires an ethnic core which results from the
nationalism created before it (Hutchinson 2003, 7-9). A final voice on the topic of
ethnonationalism is Krustarev, who believes that nations are resultant of an ethnic group he calls
an ethnos, quite similar to Smith. Unlike the other scholars in the conversation, however,
Krustarev comes to a rather abrupt conclusion: Utilizing nationalism to build a state is too
difficult and far too culpable to many discriminatory practices. Therefore, Krustarev believes the
concept of a nation should be thrown out altogether (Krustarev 2009, 92-96). All of these
scholars emphasize the importance of the ethnic group in relation to nationalism and
nationalism’s influence on the state, though they vary on their final conclusions from that fact.
Aside from these three primary forms of nationalism, there are a few other offhand schools of
thought which contribute to the conversation, like nationalism as a transfer of power.
Breuilly argues that nationalism is a force which is driven not particularly by identity, but
by a desire for status and power. Breuilly believes that nationalist movements cannot exist
without a state to go along with them, because nationalist movements are nothing more than a
group moving in for a power transfer (Schnee 2001, 10). Lupel similarly argues that nationalism
is politically linked to citizenship and tied to the rise of an ethnic group to a sovereign status
(Lupel 2004, 164). Another scholar who focuses on nationalism as a manifestation of power
transfer is Liah Greenfield who argues that regardless of any sort of shared history or culture,
what nationalism ultimately is, is a group striving for status and recognition in a context where
they do not currently possess such recognition (Schnee 2001, 12). These scholars see nationalism
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much more simply than their counterparts. The power complexities are there, but they do not
recognize the cultural and personal impacts of nationalism. Rather, they focus in on nationalism
in the political sense, wherein it’s a tool for a nationalist group to gain power and status.
A final take on nationalism arrives to the conversation from two scholars who share a
very similar perspective, Calhoun and Brubaker. Their analysis of the nation and resultant
nationalism is quite simple, neither scholar believes that the nation actually exists. Rather, they
see the nation and nationalism as a lens through which to talk about the modern world. Brubaker
in particular argues that the nation is contingent on nationalism and preexisting inter-state
systems (Schnee 2001, 12-14). Greatly varying from all other scholars who, regardless of their
ideas, argue for the existence of the nation and the nationalism that goes along with it, Calhoun
and Brubaker have immensely different perspectives from other scholars in the field.
Naturally, it must be noted that the conversation is not entirely harmonious. Though
dissenters to the entire concept of nationalism and how it impacts nation-states are rare, they are
existent, nonetheless. One such example is Wimmer and Feinstein who argue the perspective that
every single scholar named previously is wrong based on an analysis of 145 countries’ road to
nation statehood that they researched (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). As demonstrated,
nationalism is a field rife with varying perspectives and arguments. A harmonious consensus on
the topic is nearly impossible.
Globalism
Globalism, particularly as it relates to nationalism and the nation state, has a long and
nuanced history. To some scholars, globalism is a destructive force which has torn down the
nation state and left it in shambles. To others, globalism is a force which has been working with
nationalism and the nation state for centuries. As the global nature of the world ramps up and
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impacts nation states, making this topic particularly relevant as this paper explores the causation
of the decline of the nation state, it is worthwhile to investigate how globalism as a force is seen
by scholars.
The first analysis of globalism that this paper will concern itself with is the scholars who
see globalism as a force that takes down the nation state rather than aiding it. Gerhard Wilfried is
one such scholar. She begins by noting that a modern nation state is based on three primary
principles: state territoriality, state sovereignty, and state secularity. In older times, argues
Wilfried, the state could effectively fulfill these requirements, its reach being greater than any
other groups which might try to challenge it. But now, in the age of globalization, with the rise of
transnational corporations (TNCs) and new technology, the state has relinquished much of its
sway and control (Wilfried 2002, 81-83). Furthermore, states have lost their right to sovereignty
due to organizations like the United Nations and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
(ibed., 87-88). Li, similarly, focuses on the stress of outside influences and fiscal troubles have
on a state. Li shares the perspective that NGOs and TNCs are a major detriment to the nation
state and have resulted in them becoming nothing more than shallow shelves who carry out
globalization (Li 2002, 145-147). Li diverges from Wilfried on one major point, however. Li,
unlike Wilfried, makes an explicit link between ethnonationalism and globalization, aligning
them ethnonationalist movements which gain help from outside forces of globalization to push
forward their nationalism (ibed., 144). Wilfried makes no reference to ethnonationalism and is
instead primarily concerned with the impact of the flow of information and outside forces on the
stability of the nation state. For other scholars, however, the very things that concern Wilfried
and Li are what they find beneficial about globalization.
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One thing is in common for every scholar in this rather monumental group – they view
globalism as a force that has worked with the nation state since its conception as a boon rather
than a bane. The foremost scholar on the benefits of globalism is Michael Mann, who argues that
nation-state growth pre-supposed global expansion and enhanced it (Mann 1997). Supporting
this theory of enhancement of the nation state put forward by Mann are scholars like Weiss and
Fulcher. Fulcher agrees with Mann and points out that globalism began growing with the first
indications of the nation state in the 15th century. The relationship has been one which has
facilitated a symbiotic growth of nationalism and nation states as globalism has grown. (Fulcher
2000, 526-529) Weiss takes it a step further and argues that in the modern nation state system,
states have used collaborative efforts facilitated by globalism to enhance their security and power
(Weiss 2000, 10-13). Mansfield and Solingen echo this sentiment. They propose that through
globalization, states gain capital and therefore increase their overall security through that capital
(Mansfield and Solingen 2010, 154). Fulcher and Carnoy, unlike the other scholars, also make an
explicit effort to note that TNCs do not actually exist – there is no corporation which transcends
a country. Every corporation is beholden to their home country, both in economic policies and
for having a place for capital to be invested. Therefore, nation states have much more control
over the seemingly wild stage of global economics than it might seem initially. (Carnoy 2001,
71-73; Fulcher 2000, 531-535). Roshwald takes a similar approach and makes the effort of
pointing out that much of the idea that globalization is harming the nation state comes from the
assumption that there was a point in history in which the nation state triumphed over all forms of
governance. Globalism can’t, in Roshwald’s opinion, harm state sovereignty because there was
never a situation in which nationalism had uninhibited rule over the global order (Roshwald
2011, 12). Roshwald’s argument is more-so concerned with the fact that globalism is not actively
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harming the nation state, whilst the other scholars concern themselves with proving that
globalization has actively facilitated, shaped and allowed the nation state to exist and that the
perceptions of globalization’s impact on nation states is vastly overblown.

Methodology
The work in this thesis varies from the dominant theories surrounding nationalism. While
aligning itself primarily with the concept of the imagined community presented by Benedict
Anderson, this thesis rejects his idea – as well as the idea of any other scholars of nationalism –
that sovereignty is a prerequisite of a nation. In the view of this thesis, a nation can exist and
frequently does without any form of sovereignty, though it acquiesces that frequently a nation
ends up seeking out self-sovereignty as a means of expanding their political authority to better
serve the nation. Within the data, this thesis will present the cases of two historically secessionist
regions, each with their unique subnational identities, illustrating that it was the failure of the
states they’re under to incorporate these subnational identities at their conception of their
‘nation’ which leads to the decline of the nation-state. Analyzing the trends, historic and modern,
which are consistent across the regions and subnational identities will serve to prove that these
trends of the nation-state neglecting these subnational identities, widely applicable globally, are
responsible for the decline of the nation-state system in the 21st century.
The sources of data for this thesis, given that it is concerning itself with two different
case studies from two different areas of the world, will naturally have a bit of variance to it. I
will consult secondary accounts of the histories of these regions in relation to their metropoles,
with a particular focus on how their individual secessionist movements have existed throughout
their history. This will include how they were unsuccessfully incorporated or accounted for when
their metropole constructed their idea of the ‘nation’. Then, utilizing primary sources of the
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legal/government documents surrounding these secessionist regions both historically and
contemporarily, this thesis will further enlighten the exact reasons these regions looked to
secession as their answer. To garner accurate data on the current situation of the secessionist
movements this paper will consult primary accounts from newspapers and other news media to
garner an understanding of the reactions surrounding the attempted moments of secession at their
critical point, as well as the aftermath and contemporary status of the movement.
The data collected throughout this thesis was found, as noted, primarily in secondary
sources located through databases. These secondary sources provided a historical trail of the two
secessionist movements, explaining the build-up to moment of attempted secession. Primary
sources such as legal and governmental documentation was gathered through archives on various
government websites for each of these secessionist regions. The newspaper sources utilized to
understand the contemporary status of these movements as well as their status at the critical
moment were located from a variety of news outlets, primarily digitally. Data was sampled from
the late 20th century, as well as the last 20 years given that these were the moments at which
these secessionist regions had their critical moments with their metropoles. Data was also
gathered on an extremely limited, as needed basis from the 19th century to contextualize
historical relationships between these secessionist regions and their metropoles.
The data will exhibit trends consistent across each of the secessionist regions. Through
these trends, this thesis is better able to understand and exemplify that which causes a region to
seek secession. As discussed prior, these trends found within these nations are widely
representative of the exact particulars which destabilize and challenge the nation-state at large.
These trends, such as language oppression and subnational identities which vary from the greater
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state, will be located via historical accounts as well as modern governmental documentation
which gives the exact reasoning for why a region wants to secede.
The data serves to bolster and prove my argument in exploring the complexities of the
subnational identities in the regions and what problems arise that cause them to seek
independence. This thesis argues that it is the fault of the state that, at their conception of the idea
of what it means to be a national of their country, failed to acknowledge and incorporate the
subnational identities which formed within these regions. This leads, as the data will exemplify,
to discontent and unrest which in many cases eventually blossoms into a secessionist movement.
This concept of subnational identities connects intrinsically with the literature on nationalism.
These two case studies are nations, nations with long and complex histories and in some cases,
presupposing the creation of their metropoles. As explained, these subnational communities
connect with the concept of the imagined community posited by Anderson. These nations have
formed themselves, chose their own parameters, and created communities within their
boundaries and their shared sense of otherness. Not only will the data prove that historically, the
nation-state system has never been as stable as its seemed, but that these subnational identities
are the primary reason for a nation-state struggling. The case studies will add further complexity
to the debate by cataloguing the nuanced reasons why various subnational communities
experience discontent. While this thesis thoroughly believes that the trends causing a subnational
community to seek secession are fairly consistent, each has a nuance the other lacks which
individualizes their movement and adds another complex cause for the decline of the nationstate.

Data And Analysis
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Nations existing within larger states and varying from those states is a phenomenon that
is repeated globally. In nearly every state of the world, there is an example of internal,
subnational identity and nation which has a disharmonious identity than that of their metropole.
The data overwhelmingly points to the fact that when a state fails to acknowledge and support a
subnational group, even worse in cases where the subnational group is exploited, the state
stumbles. There are many outcomes for this disjunction in the state, though most frequently the
result is attempted secession or some form of violence. This thesis will focus on several aspects
which surround the disjunction between state and nation. The foremost is secessionist
movements, ￼of which the case studies of this thesis both engage in and have made many
attempts at. Another concept that this thesis seeks to work through is the historical oppression of
these regions and how that planted an instability in the state from the inception of the region.
This will be exemplified by exploring the historical circumstances of these regions in the
appropriate context. Alongside historical oppression, this thesis also wishes to engage with the
contemporary repression of these nations’ identities and how, even today, the metropoles of
these states are seeking to calm the subnational clash by erasing it. This thesis will also explore
the exploitation and underserving of these regions by their metropoles with a particular focus on
how that trend is repeated in other states.
There are several reasons that this thesis has chosen secessionist movements to exemplify
its argument for the decline of the nation-state. The foremost reason is the visibility of
secessionist movements. They’re phenomena that keep occurring time and time again in state
after state and, given their increasing frequency, are now raising the question of why.
Secessionist movements are visible and highly political examples of a nation-state failing, and it
is therefore immensely worth the time to analyze these cases to understand what is at the core of
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nation-state deterioration. Within a secessionist region, you see most clearly what ails the nationstate. The grievances which destabilize a nation-state play out in a microcosm within a
secessionist region. From unfair taxation to cultural oppression and more, the core problems a
state is going to face and suffer from play out foremost in their most outskirt groups – their
subnational identities, frequently realized in secessionist movements. At this present moment,
there are over 60 secessionist movements active in the world and many of them for the same
reasons as that of Catalonia and Quebec. These two case studies are microcosms of a much
bigger issue, one that allows for a closer look at what ails the nation-state.
The first case study to be analyzed will be Catalonia, though the organization of both case
studies will be similar. This section will begin by exploring the history of Catalonia in Spain and
explain how the region has always existed in a vacuum of autonomy in Spain, disjointed with the
Spanish government and Spanish identity (Payne 1971, 15-16). The thesis will then work
through the data surrounding the historical repression of the Catalonian subnational identity,
particularly in the context of how it clashes with Spanish identity. The data will then move to the
modern secessionist movement and the reasons cited by Catalonia for their desired separation, as
well as the Spanish reaction. The data for Catalonia will finish by exemplifying the various ways
that Spain has exploited or underserved Catalonia as a region and reflecting on its effect on the
state’s stability. The focus will then switch to the next case study of Quebec. The format will be
very similar to Catalonia, beginning with the history of Quebec in Canada and Quebecois’
varying identity within Canada. Following that, similar to Catalonia, this section will
demonstrate how Canada has historically failed to incorporate Quebecois identity and actively
rejected the subnational identity in favor of the overwhelming idea of a “Canadian.” Like
Catalonia, the analysis will move to Quebec’s contemporary referendums and attempts at
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establishing autonomy and how that has played out in Canadian government. Finally, like
Catalonia, the last part of the data will exemplify how Quebec’s resources have been capitalized
on by the Canadian government and how that affects the region’s overall place in Canada.
Through these data analyses, this thesis seeks to support its overall claim that sub nationalism is
responsible for the decline of the nation-state and exemplify the complex aspects of this thesis’
subclaims which contribute to the overall trends pushing the decline of the nation-state system
globally.

Figure 1: Map of Catalonia in context of Spain, taken from
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Localitzaci%C3%B3_de_Catalunya.png

Catalonia
Catalonia is likely one of the foremost and most evocative examples of how a subnational
identity can deconstruct a state in the modern era. A small region in the Northeast of Spain,
bordering France, Andorra and the Mediterranean, Catalonia has a long and sordid history of
seeking autonomy. As a part of Spain, Catalonia has an inexhaustible history as its own
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autonomous and perhaps most importantly immensely wealthy state. All the greater problems
which would impact Spain played out first in Catalonia (Payne 1971, 15-17). Starting from the
17th century, the integration of Catalonia into Spain when Spain was the Hispano-Habsburg
Empire was a problem from the beginning, immediately met with revolts and anger (Payne 1971,
16). It was not until the 18th century that Catalonia was successfully brought into the Spanish
flock, but things did not remain calm for very long. Catalanism – the specific name for
Catalonian nationalism – first began with the publication of Lo Catalinisme by an author named
Almirall, published in 1887. Since then, the movement of Catalanism was always a topic of
concern. The parties that support Catalanism have gone in and out of power since the 19th
century, but one undeniable fact of Spanish political life is that Catalanism is always there (ibid.,
24-27). Catalan made its first genuine attempt at secession under the leadership of Francesco
Cambo; While this attempt would ultimately fail as Cambo and his associates failed to act like
revolutionaries while pursuing a revolution, this was the first instance wherein seeds of societal
revolution were sown for Catalan (ibid., 28). After another failed revolution in the mid 1900s,
Catalan would settle down for a time (ibid., 24-28). However, it was an irrevocable fact that the
seeds of secession were sown in Catalan’s consciousness and could now never fully be uprooted,
despite how hard Spain might try.
The reemergence of Catalonia’s subnational identity is a direct response to Spain
suppressing that very identity. Spain as a country had a long forty years under the dictatorship of
Francisco Franco, during which Spain’s national identity was formed under an aggressive and
authoritarian regime which put strict parameters on what it meant to be “Spanish.” (Blas 2013,
…). Catalonia, more so than any other region of Spain, suffered under this principle, with a
heavy target on their language, Catalonian. Catalonian is an ancient language, going back to the
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9th century A.D. The language rapidly become the dominant language in the region, due to
protection by the historical Spanish Crown of Aragon (Duerr 2015, 103). The relationship
between the Catalonian language and the Spanish language was historically contentious, with
both languages struggling for dominance in the region (ibid.) During the 1940s, Spain shut
down nearly all public, cultural and educational outlets for learning Catalonian, with a desire to
make Catalonians ‘Speak the Language of the Empire!’ This cultural repression was worsened
by mass-immigration into Catalonia, which caused the Catalonian-speaking population in the
region to rapidly dwindle (Payne 1971, 47-49). It must be noted that Catalonia is hardly a dying
language. It is the 18th most common language in Europe, out of the roughly 200 spoken across
Europe, with approximately 4 million people who speak it as their first language (Duerr 2015,
115). To this day, speaking Catalonian in Spain results in the speaker being looked down upon
and whether one uses Catalonian or not is seen as a political act within the country (ibid., 103).
Catalonia’s independence groups focused on language revitalization programs, attempting to
increase the official popularity of Catalonian (ibid., 115) but it remained dominated by Spanish
countrywide and in the region itself.
After the fall of Franco’s regime and some time had passed, Spanish patriotism and
nationalist ideas lost stigmatization that they had acquired during the regime and began to
expand and grow in favor again. Naturally, this renewed concept of what it meant to be a
Spaniard would infringe on Catalonian identity further (Blas 2013). In 1978, Spain attempted to
appease the grievances of the Catalonians, granting the region the status of a “historic nation.”
(Duerr 2015, 104) The situation was further complicated in 1979, when the State Autonomy of
Catalan was passed which defined Catalonia as a ‘demos’; I.e, single sovereignty constituted by
all Spaniards. The first effect of this was that it meant, officially, Catalan could not secede
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without the consent of Spain (Guibernau 2014, 111-112). Catalonia was put into a difficult
position. They were given the recognition as a nation and distinguishment from Spain they so
deeply wanted, but Spain simultaneously restricted their political power. However, this moment
was also the birth of Catalonia’s ‘civic nationalism.’ Though they have an indisputable
Catalonian identity, embodied in their language and culture, Catalan also believes that anyone
who wants to be Catalonian, can be (Gulmez and Buhari-Gulmez 2020). The post-Franco era
was a moment of reclamation for Catalonia. Their focus shifted on restoring parts of Catalan
culture which had been suppressed under Franco, as well as erase parts of Spanish culture that
had crept into Catalonian such as bullfighting, which they considered barbaric (Duerr 2015, 118).
Spain attempted to create an inclusive national identity, but it was far too late. Their oppression
of Catalonia’s culture continued, and Catalonia actively rejected Spanish culture in return. The
disharmony was too deeply entrenched, already. In addition to this, Spain fell comfortably into a
cycle of exploitation of Catalonia.
Catalonia as a region of Spain has a deeply entrenched history of exploitation at the
hands of the Spanish government. Catalonia is a rich region, and for a large part of its history,
has been the richest region in Spain (Gulmez and Buhari-Gulmez 2020). Currently, Catalonia sits
comfortably as the third wealthiest region in Spain and experiences a great amount of wealth
disparity between itself and the rest of the regions in Spain (Duerr 2015, 106). Equalization
payments, distributed to the various regions of Spain for welfare and infrastructure, knock
Catalonia down from third wealthiest region in Spain to the tenth (ibid.) One of the biggest
grievances for Catalonia was and is the amount of economic prosperity they contribute to Spain,
which is not paid back to them in any sort of dividend. A great majority of their tax revenue has
gone to Spain, and they see very little of it returned to them (Gulmez and Buhari-Gulmez 2020).
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Catalonians feel they are forced to humiliate themselves, going to Madrid to beg for money to
support themselves which belonged to them to begin with (Duerr 2015, 143). This exploitation
combined with suppression of their identities could only last so long.
Catalonia’s contemporary reach for independence began in 2009 in a small town called
Arenys de Munt, a municipality near Barcelona. In September, 2009, the town hosted an
unofficial referendum regarding separating from Spain. Two years later, the movement would
build and in Barcelona itself, there would be an unofficial referendum vote for independence
with 91% of the voters voting in favor of independence (Duerr 2015, 107). Though unofficial, it
showed a desire in Catalonia for independence. In 2014, the Catalonian parliament would set up
the procedures to host an official referendum vote (ibid., 108), eventually setting the stage for a
formal attempt at secession
The first inkling of independence came in 2015, when the Regional Parliament of
Catalonia adopted a statute that explicitly declared Catalonia as a ‘nation’, much to the unease of
those in Madrid (ibid.). The Spanish Constitutional Court was quick to act, invalidating several
aspects of the statute with a focus on the nationhood of Catalonia, the Catalan language and any
ideas of political autonomy from Spain. Essentially, Spain sought to invalidate the Catalonian
identity (ibid.). The push for explicit secession began in 2011, when the Catalan Independence
Movement finally gained footing in the Catalan National Assembly. This movement would
escalate and by 2013 the Catalan Parliament was actively referring to itself as a sovereign,
political and legal entity, causing even more panic for Spain (Guibernau 2014, 106-107). The
Catalonian Independence movement came to a head in 2017, when the Catalonian Parliament
published the Catalan Declaration of Independence. At the beginning of this declaration, they
make their reasons for separation quite clear: “The Catalan nation, its language and its culture
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have a thousand years of history…Today Catalonia restores its full sovereignty (lost and long
sought) after decades of honestly and loyally seeking institutional coexistence with the people of
the Iberian Peninsula.” (Declaration of Independence of The Catalan Republic). Catalonia makes
it clear – this is about their identity, the identity that Spain has long taken away from them and
has put in decades of effort to repress. For Spain’s part, they rejected the Declaration of
Independence immediately, using their constitution to argue that Spain as a state is indissoluble
and Catalonia has no legal right to secede. Furthermore, they deployed the military on
Catalonians, seeking to repress the movement as swiftly as possible (Guibernau 2014, 110-112).
After the immediate violence, the prime minister of Spain, Mariano Rajoy, dissolved the regional
government of Catalonia and ordered new elections in the region, while within the Parliament of
Spain and Catalonia, tensions rose as Catalan lawmakers protested votes which would invalidate
the will of Catalan (Minder and Kingsley 2017). Despite this physically and politically violent
oppression, Catalonia is not done with its independence movement. In 2021, Catalonia saw the
election once more of a pro-independence majority in their parliament headed by their new
president, Pere Aragones. President Aragones has expressed a desire to re-open independence
negotiations with Spain (Bell 2022). Clearly, the story of Catalonian independence is far from
over, and it is a story that is heavily reflected in the story of Quebec.
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Figure 2: Map of Quebec in context of Canada, taken from
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Quebec_in_Canada_2.svg

Quebec
Quebec is a region which, like Catalonia, has reached for independence since its
inception. Quebec is located in the east of Canada, bordering the USA and Arctic Ocean. Much
like Catalonia, Quebec found itself in a position where it never quite fit into Canada, always
“othered” for some reason or the other revolving around its subnational identity. Separatism and
a sense of a sub-national identity have been a part of Quebec since its beginnings (Richez and
Bodet 2012, 77). The relationship between Quebec and Canada has been far less tumultuous than
that of Spain and Catalonia, with more calm periods than violent periods. However, upon closer
analysis, the cause of grievances in Catalonia are no less present in Quebec.
As noted, a differing sub-national identity has been part of the Quebecois identity since
their inception. Quebec was formally incorporated into the Canadian federation in 1867, but the
sense of being a Quebecois, distinct from being Canadian, existed long before. This subnational
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identity began due to the variety in Quebec’s colonization from the rest of Canada. Quebec was
colonized by France, therefore being a community of Francophones, making them linguistically
and culturally distinct from their fellow Canadians who were settled by English conquest
(Albinski 1974, 155; Dutter 2012, 60-62). In a census in 1971, it was revealed that in Quebec,
80.7% of the population of the province spoke French as their primary language. In greater
Canada, this number was a mere 26.9%. Unable to communicate effectively with their
countrymen, the Quebecois were further isolated into their own nationalistic identity. Many
noted that they frequently felt that to assimilate into the rest of Canada, they had to give up their
Quebecois identity (Albinski 1974, 155-156). Despite these fundamental differences in identity,
the circumstances between Quebec and Canada stayed relatively calm until the turning point, the
year of 1960.
1960 was the year where Quebec separatism truly asserted itself into mainstream
Canadian politics. The “Quiet Revolution” began, an era in which Quebecois experienced an
uptick in secular and liberal attitudes, a shift from an agricultural to industrial economy, as well
as a growing population of young, educated, and urban populous of Quebecois who championed
strong beliefs in Quebec identity and nationalism (Dutter 2012, 65). Politics in the province also
had a dramatic shift in favor of Quebecois independence, with the defeat of the Union Nationale
by the Liberal Party who pushed Quebec-independence friendly policies (ibid.). The mood of the
province was undeniably changing to be more oriented around a sense of Quebecois identity. As
René Lévesque, the future leader of the Parti Québécois (PQ), expressed in 1963, “First and
foremost I am Québécois, and second – with a growing sense of doubt – a Canadian.” (Glazier
1977, 156) The feeling among Quebecois that they had never been Canadian, only Québécois,
was on the rise. With this came an unrest that some might argue was natural.
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For a time, before settling into the strangled political dance that has dominated Quebecois
separatism for most of its existence, the movement turned violent, engaging in acts of domestic
terrorism. From the years of 1963 to 1972, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) was
responsible for countless bombings, deaths, and several kidnappings and murders in the name of
Quebec’s freedom (Albinski 1974, 159; Dutter 2012, 66-67; Glazier 1977, 155). The FLQ was
eventually disassembled and faded into the background, allowing for the rise of more politically
calculated moves. Next came the rise of the Parti Québécois, a party explicitly for Quebec
secession which would gain a majority in the province’s parliament in 1976 (Richez 2012, 7778). PQ was a party that believed that Quebec could not thrive and could not protect itself – or
rely on Canada for protection – within the greater Canadian country (Albinski 1974,
159). Headed by René Lévesque, who explicitly believed Quebec secession was necessary to
preserve their language and culture, the party’s abrupt rise came as a shock to everyone –
Lévesque included. Still, the party forged ahead, with one of their first actions to markedly
declare Quebec’s individuality, changing the slogan on Quebec license plates from “La Belle
Province” – the beautiful province – to “Je me Souviens” – I remember. Je me Souviens,
meaning Quebec remembered their origins, remembered that to be Quebecois was to be different
(Glazier 1977, 155-156). Furthermore, PQ pursued aggressive language policies, passing a
“Charter of the French Language” in 1977 which mandated the sole usage of French on public
signs. In addition, access to English-language schooling was restricted in the province (Dutter
2012, 68). The Canadian Supreme Court would later rule this bill unconstitutional, but it speaks
to the strong and indignant sense with which Quebec upheld and pushed their sub national
identity, as well as how it affected the stability of Canada. As for the reaction of the Canadian
government and peoples to all this? Under the terror of the FLQ, the prime minister at the time,
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Pierre Trudeau, had reacted with strict oppression in order to quell the terrorist front. But as the
much more peaceful PQ took charge of the province, the government became amenable to
incorporating some of Quebec’s demands, though notably not the PQ’s demand of sovereignty
(ibid. 68-70). Though PQ was peaceful compared to the FLQ, secession was what they wanted,
and the referendums naturally followed.
The first Quebecois referendum concerning secession and sovereignty came in 1980, only
a couple of years after the PQ’s rise to power. The referendum was on the question of a mandate
to negotiate sovereignty-association with the Canadian federal government (1980 Referendum).
The Referendum from the beginning revealed fractures in the relationship between Canadian
identity and Quebecois identity. The “yes” camp, headed of course by René Lévesque, focused
on the idea of unity and a collective Quebecois identity. The “no” camp on the other hand
focused on emphasizing that one could be both Quebecois and Canadian, wrapping it all up in a
neat slogan: “Mon nom est québécois.”, my name is Québécois (Rocher 2014, 31). It becomes
abundantly clear that from the beginning, these referendums and Quebec’s struggle was about
the disharmony between their identity and the Canadian identity. When all was said and done
with this referendum, the “yes” vote had netted 40.44% of the vote in the region (Richez and
Bodet 2012, 77-78; 1980 Referendum). The referendum failed, but it was simply a precursor of
what was to come.
As for the aftermath of the referendum, the reaction of Canada and the Quebecois was
controversial. The Referendum was used simultaneously as justification for public sympathy and
efforts by politicians to further incorporate the French-speaking minority as well as for antipathy
and increased antibilingualism lobbying and policies (Gold 1984, 110). The Referendum
increased inter-ethnic conflict in the country and ironically, though it failed, deepened the sense
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of a Quebecois identity and the feeling of needing an independent state (ibid.). Though the next
referendum would be a while off, the Quebecois desire for independence would ebb and flow
over the years. For example, in a poll in 1990, 66% of Quebecois overall supported separatist
goals and 71% of Quebecois francophones (Dutter 2012, 71). Meanwhile, the Canadian
government attempted to keep Quebec satiated, adopting a resolution in 1981 affirming the right
of Quebec to self-determination and that Quebec was a unique society within Canada, referring
to it as a “distinct national community.” Ironically, though, this resolution was passed with the
consent of all provinces except Quebec (Rocher 2014, 33). The Canadian government would
then spend the next several years doing all they could to reduce Quebec’s political power and
undermine their ability to seek self-determination (ibid., 33-34). As one would expect, this left
Quebec massively dissatisfied and frustrated, raising the next referendum.
The context of the 1995 Referendum was vastly different from the 1980 Referendum.
Canada had a new constitution, and it had gone through two failed ventures of constitutional
negotiation with Quebec to bring the province into the fold. The new Prime Minister of Canada
was not bending to any of Quebec’s demands, and the province was growing irate (ibid., 34-36).
Based on the growing irritancies of Quebec and the failure by Canada to successfully bring
Quebec into its new constitutional fold, the Referendum of 1995 was launched to the Quebecois.
The question this time was simple and direct: Should Quebec become sovereign from Canada?
(1995 Referendum; Referendums in Quebec) The results came as a shock to the country. When
the voting was all over, 49.52% of Quebec had voted yes, and 50.58% had voted no (1995
Referendum: Richez and Bodet 2012, 77-78). The unity of Canada survived by a thread, and it
became abundantly clear to all parties involved that Quebec was far more serious about its
independence than they had perhaps ever realized. With this shock to their system, the Canadian
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government moved swiftly, making sure to define in Canada’s Supreme Court that Quebec could
not legally secede under international law or domestic law, being that they legally could not be
considered “oppressed” under Canadian laws. Furthermore, the government passed the Clarity
Act of 2000, which set out three definitions that in essence made it the Canadian government’s
decision whether or not a referendum on secession could be raised again (Rocher 2014, 40-42;
Clarity Act 2000). Quebec, through a little under half a century of aggressively pursuing its right
to sovereignty and its national identity, had scared the Canadian government into trying to make
sure it’s stability could never be threatened again.
Since the two referendums, Quebec has mostly settled back into a sort of calm. After the
near shattering of Canada at their hands and the subsequent rush to both appease Quebec and
restrict its constitutional powers, the province and its innate desire for independence has
remained a shadow on the Canadian political stage. Ironically, Quebec is back where they
started. Their near achievement of independence caused panic in the Canadian government, who
effectively restricted their political power and “othered” the region once more, as they had been
“othered” a century prior. Support for independence has hovered at a steady high thirties to low
forty percent in the years since and the PQ along with two new parties in support of Quebec
sovereignty – Liberal Party of Quebec (LPQ) and Action Démocratique du Québec – have
remained prominent parties in Canadian politics (Richez and Bodet 2012, 77-79). Still, despite
their seeming acquisition, Quebec remains dissatisfied with their position in Canada. The current
premier of Quebec, Francois Legault, remains a nationalist. While he does not explicitly support
separatism, he has sworn to amend Canada’s constitution to make French the official – and only
– language of the country as well as have it written in that Quebec is, explicitly, a nation
(Ljunggren 2021). Despite years of conflict and years of attempted resolution, what it means to
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be Quebecois and what it means to be Canadian has yet to reach a satisfactory end for either
party. As the next election in Quebec steadily approaches paired with social unrest in Canada,
the question is pressing on whether Quebec will once more make another move for
independence, some 25 years after their most significant try.
Wider Impact
Throughout this section, this thesis has covered the underlying reasons behind the
secessionist movements of Catalonia in Spain and Quebec in Canada. This section has covered
various reasons behind the secessionist movements in these two case studies. Language
oppression, exploitation, cultural disharmony, and the existence of these subnational identities
within these regions all contribute to their reasons for secession, as well as the destabilization of
their states at large. As demonstrated, both Spain and Canada failed to account for or actively
sought to exclude the subnational identities of Catalonia and Quebecois at their conception of
what it means to be Spanish and Canadian respectively. These subnational identities which exist
and are not welcomed into the nation-state at large are the main source of unrest within the
countries, as they have experienced years of abuse and exploitation at the hands of their
metropoles and have now – or recently – reached a breaking point.
The trends which push them towards secession and unrest are not unique to either region,
though they both carry with them their distinguishing nuances. Within both regions, they
experience language and cultural oppression. In both Spain and Canada, Catalonia and Quebec
experienced legal prohibition of their language and teaching, and those who speak either
Catalonian or French are looked down upon by their countrymen even into the contemporary era.
Spain has made being Catalonian incompatible with being Spanish, and likewise Canada has
made being Quebecois incompatible with being Canadian. Regardless, neither region wants to be
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part of their metropoles’ larger national identity. The Catalonians reject Spanish identity, and the
Quebecois reject Canadian identity. Culturally, both historically and contemporarily, its an
incompatibility – and one that doesn’t seem to be solvable in any way, shape, or form. Too many
historical slights, too much abuse, too much exploitation, all combined has made being part of
their larger nation-state completely undesirable to these subnational communities.
What is important to take away from these case studies is the fact that these trends are not
unique to Catalonia and Quebec. Like these two regions experience similarities which draw them
towards secession and a destabilization of their larger nation-states, there are hundreds of regions
globally which experience similar phenomenon. From subnational identities of immigrants in
France, which the French identity fundamentally rejects, to the United States of America which
has subnational identities like Texas who experience disharmony with their greater state and
frequently express a desire to secede, subnational identities are found all over the world. In each
subnational community, the problems which plague it are the grievances which will come to
affect their larger state. Subnational identities are frequent, varying, and complicated. Clearly,
they heavily affect the wellbeing of their metropoles and in the case of looking to what ails the
nation-state, there is no clearer explanation than the subnational identities in these nation-states.
These subnational identities were not accounted for at the conception of the nation-state’s idea of
a ‘nation’. In the case of some, the state actively chose to exclude these subnational identities. In
the 21st century, the failure to acknowledge and incorporate these subnational identities at the
conception of the nation-state leads to unrest and complications, causing destabilization of the
nation-state. Globally, this phenomenon is repeated over and over again. Wholly, the nationstates of the 21st century have all made the same mistake at the moment of the conception of their
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idea ‘nation.’ Contemporarily, they are left with these subnational identities that they now must
contend with their failure to incorporate decades, possibly centuries, ago.

In Conclusion
As demonstrated throughout the course of this thesis, the 21st century emerges as another
prominent moment in the history of the nation-state. It has achieved its dominance, rising to be
the most prevalent and most common form of establishing a state in the world. In just 30 short
years, the nation-state system has established itself in a way no other global order has been able
to do up until this moment in history, the pace at which it became the dominant form and its
widespread usage unprecedented in history. But as this thesis has noted, it’s a system in its
infancy historically and like many other historical moments, it is experiencing its first,
unavoidable challenges. This thesis has proven that the nation-state is not as stable or as
unchallenged as it appears to be, and ironically, the biggest threat to the nation-state seems to be
itself.
This thesis has established that currently, the most pressing challenge to the nation-state
system is a problem of their own making. Subnational identities exist in every state in the world
and it was their own failure to incorporate these subnational identities at the conception of their
idea of a ‘nation’ that is causing complications now, in the 21st century. Decades of ignoring,
exploiting, abusing and in some situations actively oppressing these subnational identities has
finally risen to a point where the nation-state can no longer ignore the challenges arisen from
their neglect. What is most ironic about this is that these subnational identities ultimately want a
nation-state of their own. This thesis therefore posits that the greatest problem with the nationstate in the 21st century is not necessarily the system of organizing into a nation-state, but rather
that these massive, conglomerate states – evocative of the colonial empires of the 19th century –
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are not sustainable. Subnational identities are too strong and as demonstrated, these subnational
communities will only accept oppression and destruction of their identities for so long.
Furthermore, as this thesis has demonstrated, attempts to include subnational identities after the
conception of the idea of a ‘nation’ are a failure. Efforts will never be enough, no matter if a state
stops restricting a language or acknowledges a region as a nation. It will never be enough; it is
too little too late if the state did not include these subnational identities from the start.
So where does that leave the nation-state? It’d be easy to argue that ultimately, the
condition of the nation-state in the 21st century is altogether unchanged. After all, if the goal of
these secessionist regions is a nation-state of their own, isn’t that a testament to the power of the
nation-state? Ultimately, no, because even if these secessionist regions powered by subnational
identities are seeking a nation-state, its proof in of itself that the nation-state is not stable right
now. It’s breaking apart, fragmenting, and ultimately, it’s failing. Regardless of what these
subnational communities are seeking from their independence movements, it’s still an inarguable
fact that fundamentally, the nation-state system is failing. If it were succeeding, these subnational
identity groups would not feel the need to seek secession. In fact, were Catalonia and Quebec to
successfully secede from their metropoles, it’s extremely likely they would then experience the
development of sub-subnational identities, which then might attempt to fragment further.
The nation-state is dominant, no one can argue that fact. But it’s a system built upon
failure after failure that, for the past several decades, they were able to ignore. But now, in the
21st century, as subnational identities grow and witness other subnational communities strive for
independence, its occurring to subnational groups across the globe that they, too, can seek a
different way. It’s possible now to not be content with a state that has exploited and ignored them
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and their specific needs and identity throughout their history. The foundation of the nation-state
system is shaky, and subnational identities are realizing that they can do something about that.
This leaves the nation-state system, particularly the states that are more conglomerates of
identities, with a choice. They can attempt to adapt and to include these subnational identities,
which they failed to do decades ago, and fully acknowledge and support the positions of these
strong subnational groups within their countries. But, as seen in the case of Quebec and
Catalonia, it might be too late. The seeds of secession, of feeling “othered”, might already be too
deeply sown. Their subnational identities, like Quebec and Catalonia, can still want
independence even after acknowledgement, because the metropole has proven themselves
already to be unreliable. As proven, the reason that these subnational identities seek secession is
because their culture and their identity is neglected and sometimes oppressed by their metropole.
The metropoles of the world have proven they will crush – sometimes violently – any altering
identity that exists within their state for the sake of keeping up an idea of a ‘nation’ that is
struggling to prove itself more and more every day. These subnational identities are left with the
distinct feeling that they could better care for themselves than their state is caring for them as
well as have their culture and identity freely, leading to desires for secession and independence.
Overall, this leads to the instability of the nation-states.
The nation-state is left with very few options. This thesis will acquiesce that it does not
know what comes next if the nation-state system fails, or if it’s even possible to have a next after
this type of global order has been established. Admittedly, the nation-state system is relatively
peaceful and cooperative. Perhaps the result of this is more nation-states, which will continue to
splinter and struggle due to making the same mistakes. Or perhaps the nation-state does
successfully adapt. Perhaps it calms the discontent and unrest from its subnational identities and
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successfully incorporates them in a way it never has before. Whatever happens, this is a critical
moment in the existence of the nation-state. It’s sink or swim, it’s adapt or fail, and what choice
the nation-state will make is anyone’s guess.
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